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A Law School's Narrowly Tailored Use of Race in
Admissions Decisions, to Further a Compelling
Interest in Obtaining the Educational Benefits that
Flow From a Diverse Student Body, Does Not
Violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: Grutter v. Bollinger
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE - The United States Supreme Court held
that a law school's narrowly tailored use of race in its admissions
decisions is not prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the policy furthers a compelling
interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from hav-
ing a diverse student body.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
Barbara Grutter, a 43 year-old white resident of Michigan, ap-
plied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School (Law
School) in 1996.1 The Law School notified Ms. Grutter that she
was placed on the waiting list for further consideration, but was
subsequently declined admission to the 1997 incoming class.2 Ac-
cording to its admissions policy, the Law School sought a variety
of individuals with "a strong likelihood of succeeding in the prac-
tice of law and contributing in diverse ways to the well-being of
others."3 Although the Law School considered each applicant's
Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score and grade point aver-
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2332 (2003); see also Brief for Petitioner at 2,
Grutter (No. 02-241). Ms. Grutter had a 3.8 undergraduate grade point average and a
LSAT score of 161 at the time of her application. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332. In addition to
the application, Grutter was required to send in additional information such as a personal
statement, letters of recommendation, and an essay stating how the applicant will contrib-
ute to the life and diversity of the institution. Id. at 2331-32.
2. Brief for Petitioner at 2.
3. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2331. Prior to 1992, the Law School's policy was identified as
a "special admissions program" in order to increase the number of minority student en-
rolled. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 830 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The admission's
policy was later amended but still reflected these same principles: "a commitment to racial
and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which
have been historically discriminated against." Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332.
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age (GPA), the policy required admissions officials to consider
other criteria known as "soft variables" to assess whether an ap-
plicant could successfully contribute socially and intellectually to
the institution.' The key component of the Law School's admis-
sions policy was to enroll a "critical mass" of underrepresented
minority students,6 who would provide integration of racial and
ethnic origins within the classrooms, in an effort to achieve stu-
dent body diversity.7
Ms. Grutter initiated proceedings against the Law School8 alleg-
ing that she was denied admission because the Law School uses
race as a "predominate factor" which increased the chance of ad-
mission for applicants from favorable minority groups.' The com-
plaint further alleged that the Law School discriminated against
her constitutional rights, in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ° and Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d." In her claim, Ms. Grutter
4. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332. These "soft variables" included: the quality of the ap-
plicant's essay, the quality of the undergraduate institution, and the areas and difficulty of
undergraduate course selection. Id.
5. Id.
6. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 829. The Law School bulletin for the 1996-1997 aca-
demic year stated that "minorities, minority groups, and underrepresented minorities refer
to African American, Native American, Mexican American, and mainland Puerto Rican
students. Id.
7. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332. Erica Munzel testified that "critical mass" means
"meaningful numbers" or "meaningful representation" but stated that there is no number,
percentage or range of numbers or percentages that constitute critical mass. Bollinger, 137
F. Supp. 2d at 833-34. Dean Syverud also testified that 'critical mass cannot be quantified,
but that a professor knows when it is present because minority students feel free to express
their views, rather than to state . . . 'politically correct' views." Id. at 836. In addition,
Syverud indicated that "when a critical mass of underrepresented minority students are
present, racial stereotypes lose their force because non-minority students learn there is no
'minority viewpoint' but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority students." Id.
8. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 823. The complaint also names as defendants Lee
Bollinger, the Dean of the Law School from 1987-1994 and the President of the University
of Michigan from 1987 to the present, Jeffrey Lehman, the Dean of the Law School from
1994 to the present, Dennis Shields, the Director of Admissions at the Law School from
1991-1998, and the Regents of the University of Michigan. Id. at 824.
9. Id.
10. Id. The pertinent section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
11. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 824. The statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
states: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national ori-
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requested compensatory and punitive damages, an order requiring
the Law School to offer her admission, and an injunction prohibit-
ing the Law School from using race to discriminate in the admis-
sions process."
Using a strict scrutiny standard, 3 the district court determined
the use of race in the Law School's policy was unconstitutional and
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.1 4  In making this determination, the court con-
cluded that the argument set forth by Justice Powell in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke"s did not authorize the use of
race for an attainment of diversity as a compelling state interest."
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, reviewing the district
court's opinion de novo, 7 reversed the judgment and held that the
Law School has a compelling interest in achieving a diverse stu-
dent body and that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke established
gin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. §
2000(d) (1964).
12. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 824. Ms. Grutter also motioned for class certification
and for bifurcation of the trial into liability and damages phases. Id. The district court
defined the class as:
[AIll persons who (A) applied for and were not granted admission to the University of
Michigan Law School for the academic years since (and including) 1995 until the time
that judgment is entered herein; and (B) were member of those racial or ethnic
groups, including Caucasian, that Defendants treated less favorably in considering
their application for admission to Law School.
Id.
13. Id. at 821. "All racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." Adarand
Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). "In other words, such classifications
are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling gov-
ernmental interests." Id. Under the strict scrutiny test, the legislature must have a com-
pelling state interest to enact the law, and the measures prescribed by the law must be the
least restrictive means possible to accomplish the legislature's goal. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 712 (7th ed. 1999).
14. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 872.
15. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Alan Bakke, a white applicant, was twice rejected from the
University of California Medical School. Id. at 276. After his second rejection, Bakke initi-
ated proceedings against the Medical School alleging that the special admissions program
operated to exclude him from the school on the basis of his race in violation of his rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 277.
16. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 848. The district court stated that no other justice
joined Justice Powell in Part IV of his opinion, which was the only portion that discussed
using race in order to obtain student body diversity. Id at 849. The court also stated that
even if using race was a compelling state interest, "the Law School has not narrowly tai-
lored its use of race to achieve that interest." Id. at 872.
17. An appellate court is to conduct an independent review of the record when constitu-
tional facts are at issue. Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 241 F.3d 501, 509 (6th Cir. 2001); see
also Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 192 (6th Cir. 1997).
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binding precedent for the courts. 8 In coming to this conclusion,
the Sixth Circuit stated that the Law School's use of race and eth-
nicity were merely "plus factors" in an applicant's file considered
along with a range of other factors. 9 The court also concluded
that the Law School's use of race was narrowly tailored since the
Law School's admissions policy was indistinguishable from the
Harvard plan," which Justice Powell approved.2'
In order to resolve the disagreement between the district court
and the court of appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine "[w]hether diversity was a compelling interest that
could justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting appli-
cants for admission to public universities."2 2 The Supreme Court,
in a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice O'Connor, held that the Law
School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to
further diversity amongst the student body was not prohibited by
the Equal Protection Clause.23
The majority began its analysis by reviewing the precedent set
forth by Justice Powell twenty-five years ago in Bakke.2 Justice
Powell criticized a racial set-aside program as unconstitutional,
but did not per se prohibit the use of race in admissions policies.25
Alternatively, Justice Powell held that a state has a substantial
interest in attaining student body diversity and approved the uni-
versity's use of race solely to further this goal.26  The majority de-
cided it was not necessary to determine whether the court's hold-
18. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2001).
19. Bollinger, 288 F.3d at 746.
20. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. Under the Harvard plan, an institution could consider
the race and ethnicity of applicants, but race and ethnicity alone were not the exclusive
components of academic diversity. Id. Justice Powell approved the plan because it was
"flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular
qualifications of each applicant." Id.
21. Bollinger, 288 F.3d. at 746.
22. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335.
23. Id. at 2347. Grutter's claims based on Title VI also failed because "Title VI pro-
scribe[s] only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause."
Id.
24. Id. at 2335-36. In Bakke, Justice Powell endorsed the constitutional standards of
race-conscious admissions policies. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae
Judith Areen et al., at 12-13, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241) (stat-
ing that law schools have shaped their admissions programs based on Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke).
25. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-20.
26. Id. at 315.
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ing in Bakke was binding under Marks v. United States27 and en-
dorsed Justice Powell's diversity rationale." Next, the court ana-
lyzed the Law School's only justification for using race in its ad-
mission process, the purported educational benefits that flow from
having a diverse student body. 9 In response to this assertion,
Justice O'Connor agreed with the expert studies demonstrating
that diversity provided students with skills necessary to become
better professionals in a diverse workforce."0
After determining that the educational benefits of a diverse stu-
dent body was a compelling state interest, the majority had to de-
termine whether the admissions policy was narrowly tailored to
achieve this goal in order for it to be found constitutional.3 1 Jus-
tice O'Connor, citing Bakke, acknowledged that the admissions
policy would qualify as narrowly tailored as long as it did not use
quotas to separate those applicants with certain characteristics
from competition with other applicants or unduly harm non-
minority applicants.32 Instead, race or ethnicity could be used in
consideration for admission if it is considered a "plus" factor in a
particular applicant's file, without separating the applicant from
comparison with other qualified individuals.33 Contrary to the dis-
trict court's holding, the majority regarded the attainment of a
"critical mass" as not being synonymous with a quota system be-
cause "some attention to numbers, without more, does not trans-
form a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota."34 Justice
O'Connor likewise stated the Law School's admission policy, like
27. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). In Marks, the court explained that "[wihen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoyed the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted).
28. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
29. Id. at 2338.
30. Id. at 2340. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 850 (citing Report of
Patricia Grtin, at 3). Patricia Gruin, a professor of psychology and women's studies at the
University of Michigan, submitted research which suggested that s]tudents learn better
in a [racially and ethnically] diverse educational environment, and they are better prepared
to become active participants in our pluralistic, democratic society once they leave such
setting." Id.
31. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341-42.
32. Id. at 2342 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315). "A race-conscious admission program
must not unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic
groups." Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing).
33. Grutter, 123 S. Ct at 2343.
34. Id. at 2343 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323 (1978)).
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the Harvard Plan approved by Justice Powell, "consider[ed] all
pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifica-
tions of each applicant ... to place them on the same footing for
consideration, although not necessarily according them the same
weight."
3 5
The last issue the majority addressed was whether any other
race-neutral alternatives existed which could achieve the educa-
tional benefits of a diverse student body.36 The majority and the
Court of Appeals agreed that the alternatives proscribed by the
district court would require a dramatic sacrifice of diversity or
quality of students.37 Justice O'Connor stated her satisfaction
with the Law School's consideration of other race-neutral alterna-
tives and was assured the Law School would terminate its race-
conscious admissions policy as soon as practical.38 The majority
concluded that since the Law School's admission policy was nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a "critical mass" of underrepresented mi-
nority students to further a compelling interest of diversity, the
admissions policy was constitutional and did not violate Grutter's
Fourteenth Amendment Rights.39
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, critically examined the Law
School's alleged compelling state interest." Both Justice Thomas
and Justice Scalia scrutinized the Law School for using "critical
mass" as a mere fabrication to maintain admission of minority
students who would otherwise be disproportionately excluded.4" In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas argued that the Law
School refused to change its current admissions process because
race-neutral alternatives would reduce "academic selectivity and
would require the Law School to sacrifice a core part of its educa-
tional mission."'2 He believed the majority allowed the Law School
35. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344. The Law School considered 'each applicant's promise of
making a notable contribution to the class by way of a particular strength or characteris-
tic." Id. An applicant's potential contribution to student body diversity can be demon-
strated through an essay and a personal statement. Id.
36. Id. at 2344-45.
37. Id. at 2345. The district court suggested that the Law School could implement race-
neutral alternatives such as a lottery system for all qualified applicants or decreasing the
emphasis placed on all applicant's undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores. Id.
38. Id. at 2346.
39. Id. at 2347.
40. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined Parts I-
VII of Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion. Id. at 2350.
41. Id. at 2349 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 2356 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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to use race to advance its interest in "offering a marginally supe-
rior education while maintaining an elite institution."'3 Likewise,
Justice Thomas noted that the majority ignored evidence from
other institutions that have succeeded in reaching these objectives
without resorting to racial discrimination in its admissions poli-
cies."
In a separate dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
stated the interest being asserted by the Law School was not nar-
rowly tailored to achieve it means. 45  Although the Law School
sought to accumulate a "critical mass" of each underrepresented
minority group, Chief Justice Rehnquist disapproved of the argu-
ment because the record demonstrated that significantly more in-
dividuals were admitted from one underrepresented minority
group than from other groups.4" Chief Justice Rehnquist also con-
tended that the Law School's admissions policy failed the strict
scrutiny standard because it did not place a reasonable time limit
on the duration of its program, which is one of the factors in de-
termining whether a race-conscious program is constitutional.47
Finally, in Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion, he noted the
majority had failed to apply strict scrutiny in determining the con-
stitutionality of the Law School's race-conscious admissions pro-
gram.4' He contended that the Law School had the burden of
showing that its institution ensured that each applicant received
individual consideration and that race was not the determinative
43. Id. at 2355 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Thomas stated that the
Law School's decision to be an elite institution does not advance the welfare of the State of
Michigan because very few lawyers remain in the state. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 2359 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas cited statistics from Boalt
Hall at the University of California, Berkeley. See id. at 2359. Prior to the adoption of
California's Proposition 209, which barred the state from granting preferential treatment
on the basis of race in public education, Boalt Hall enrolled 20 blacks and 28 Hispanics. Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting). In 2002, without instituting racial discriminations in admissions,
Boalt's entering class enrolled 14 blacks and 36 Hispanics and the total underrepresented
minority student enrollment exceeded its 1996 numbers. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
45. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2365 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing).
46. Id. at 2366-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The record demonstrated that from
1995 through 2000, the Law School admitted between 13 and 19 Native Americans, be-
tween 91 and 108 African Americans, and between 47 and 56 Hispanic. Id. at 2366
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Law School failed to provide any race-specific reasons
why significantly more individuals from a certain minority were needed to achieve diver-
sity. Id. at 2367 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 2369 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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factor for admission.49 Justice Kennedy emphasized that the ma-
jority's holding, allowing racial minorities to have their special
circumstances considered in order to improve their educational
opportunities, was only permitted because of their abandonment
of the strict scrutiny standard."
The historical treatment of race in the judiciary found its roots
more than a century ago with the Supreme Court's decision to le-
galize segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson.51 The Court found it was
constitutional to provide "separate but equal"52 railroad accommo-
dations for white and colored races." In upholding the Louisiana
statute, Justice Brown rejected the Equal Protection challenge by
distinguishing between political and social equality.54 The Equal
Protection clause, Justice Brown stated, sought to enforce only
political equality." However, laws that required separation of
races in order to avoid contact with one another did not "imply the
inferiority of either race" and involved only social equality, which
the Equal Protection did not encompass.56 The majority opined,
"[i]f the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot
be inferior to the other civilly or politically... [i]f one race be infe-
rior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States
cannot put them upon the same plane."57 In his dissent, Justice
Harlan rejected the majority's position as he contended that the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed both civil and political rights
to all citizens.58 The government's separation of race, Justice
Harlan argued, necessarily implied that one of the races was infe-
rior.5" This position is summarized in Justice Harlan's famous
49. Id. at 2373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
50. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2374 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
51. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy had been arrested for violating the Louisiana statute
by purchasing a ticket for a first class seat and refusing to move from the seat to the sepa-
rate section for "colored" people. Id. at 541-42. Plessy was seven-eighths Caucasian and
one-eighth Mrican. Id. at 541.
52. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543-44. Under this doctrine, equality of treatment was accorded
when races were provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities were
separate. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
53. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551-52.
54. Id. at 544.
55. Id. at 545 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), in which the Court
held that a West Virginia law limiting juries to white males discriminated by implying
legal inferiority).
56. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
57. Id. at 551-52.
58. Id. at 555.
59. Id. at 559.
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quote: "Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tol-
erates classes among citizens."0
In 1954, the Court overruled the holding in Plessy and held the
separate but equal doctrine unconstitutional.61 In Brown v. Board
of Education,62 the United States Supreme Court stated that "seg-
regation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race
deprived children of a minority group equal educational opportu-
nities, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."6 3  Segregation, Chief Justice Warren de-
clared, was detrimental to black children's education because it
generated feelings of inferiority.' Accordingly, the Court held that
the "separate but equal" doctrine had no place in public education
because separate educational facilities were inherently unequal
and denied black children equal educational opportunities.6"
The modern era of affirmation action began a decade after
Brown was decided when Congress passed Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which provided "that no person on the grounds
of race . . .be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving federal funds."6  Under the statutory language
of Title VI of this Act, it was evident that Congress intended to
prohibit racial discrimination.67 However, the legislative history of
Title VI was ambiguous on whether Title VI intended to bar all
race-conscious efforts of federally financed programs to minori-
ties.68 This proposition became the subject of debate and allowed
60. Id. Justice Harlan further stated that "the law regards man as man, and takes no
account of his surroundings or of his color when civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme
law of the land are involved." Id.
61. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. Brown, 347 U.S. at 483. This case involved the consolidation of 4 separate cases.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 486. In each of the cases, African American minors were denied admis-
sion to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation
according to race. Id. at 487-88.
63. Id. at 483.
64. Id. at 494, In reaching its decision, the Court relied in part on Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), which
allowed intangible factors to be considered in determining whether separate schools are in
fact equal. Id. at 493-94.
65. Id. at 495.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964).
67. See LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON
RACE AND THE SCHOOLS 47-66 (1976). See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 328-37 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
68. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 328-37.
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courts to interpret the meaning of Title VI to permit discrimina-
tion in favor of a minority race.6 9
The Supreme Court had its first opportunity to address the con-
stitutionality of racial classifications in the realm of education
with its opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke." In this landmark case, Justice Powell provided the fifth
vote invalidating the Medical School of the University of Califor-
nia at Davis' (Medical School) dual-track admissions program,71
which reserved 16 out of 100 seats in the entering class for mem-
bers of minority or "economically and/or educationally disadvan-
taged groups. " " While the special admissions applicants were eli-
gible to compete for all of the available seats, the regular admis-
sions applicants were only eligible for the remaining eighty-four
seats.73 Alan Bakke, a white male, applied twice to the Medical
School in 1973 and 1974.74 In both years, Bakke's application was
considered and rejected under the general admissions program.75
69. Id.
70. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). But see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). DeFunis, a
white applicant, applied to the University of Washington Law School alleging that the law
school's policy of considering race in admissions violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 314. Believing that the issue was moot, the Court declined the opportunity to hear the
case because DeFunis had since been admitted to and was in his final year at the law
school. Id. at 317.
71. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-73. This admissions program consisted of a separate admis-
sion system operating in coordination with the regular admission process. Id. at 272-73.
Materials distributed to applicants of the 1973 entering class described the special admis-
sion program as the following:
A special subcommittee of the Admissions Committee, made up of faculty and medi-
cal students from minority groups, evaluates applications from economically and/or
educationally disadvantaged backgrounds. The applicant may designate on the ap-
plication form that he or she requests such an evaluation. Ethnic minorities that are
not categorically considered under the Task Force Program unless they are from dis-
advantaged backgrounds.
Id. at 272 n.1.
72. Id. at 274-76. The special admissions program was devised to increase the repre-
sentation of disadvantaged students in each Medical School class. Id. at 272. No formal
definition of "disadvantaged" was ever produced, but the chairman of the special committee
screened each application to see whether it reflected economic or educational deprivation.
Id. at 274-75.
73. Id. at 275-76.
74. Id. at 276. In 1973, there were four special admissions seats that remained vacant
for which Bakke was not considered. Id. Bakke's benchmark score was a 468 out of a 500.
Id.
75. Id. at 276. Under the general admissions system, a candidate whose overall under-
graduate grade point average fell below a 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 was rejected. Id. at 273.
From these remaining applicants, one out of six were invited for a personal interview and
the candidate received a benchmark score out of 500 reflecting the interviewer's summa-
ries, the candidate's overall grade point average and grade point average in science courses,
MCAT scores, letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities, and other biographical
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After his second rejection, he filed a suit alleging that "the Medical
School's special admissions program operated to exclude him on
the basis of his race, in violation of his rights under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6
Justice Powell rejected the position offered by the Medical
School that strict scrutiny should not be applied because white
males "were not a 'discrete and insular minority' requiring ex-
traordinary protection."" Instead, the Court determined that ra-
cial and ethnic distinctions are "inherently suspect and thus call
for the most exacting judicial examination."78 Justice Powell fur-
ther asserted that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else
when applied to a person of another color .... [i]f both are not ac-
corded the same protection, then it is not equal." 9 In order to jus-
tify the use of a suspect classification, "a State must show that its
purpose or interest [was] both constitutionally permissible and
substantial and its use of the classification was 'necessary to the
accomplishment' of its purpose." 80
Justice Powell addressed each of the four justifications the
Medical School offered for its special admissions program.8' The
purposes the program sought to serve were (i) to reduce the his-
toric deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical school
and in the medical profession; (ii) to counter the effects of societal
discrimination; (iii) to increase the number of physicians who will
practice in communities currently underserved; and (iv) to obtain
the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse stu-
dent body.82 Justice Powell rejected the first justification as fa-
cially invalid. 3 As to the second purpose, Justice Powell agreed
that the state did have a legitimate interest in remedying the ef-
fects of societal discrimination, but it did not justify a classifica-
tion that aids members of victimized groups at the expense of
data. Id. at 274. In both years, the applicants who were admitted under the special ad-
missions program were significantly less qualified than Bakke in relation to grade point
averages, MCAT scores, and benchmark scores. Id. at 277.
76. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277-78.
77. Id. at 290.
78. Id. at 291.
79. Id. at 289-90.
80. Id. at 305 (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)).
81. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 307.
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other innocent individuals.84 The Court did not address the Medi-
cal School's third assertion because there was no empirical data to
demonstrate how the classification was likely to have any signifi-
cant effect on the problem.85
Justice Powell found that the fourth asserted goal, the attain-
ment of a diverse student body, was the only constitutionally per-
missible goal for an institution to use in its admissions decisions. 6
Justice Powell conceptualized diversity from a mix of "experiences,
outlooks, and ideas" which could enrich a student body. When
achieving diversity, the Court noted, race or ethnicity should only
be one of many factors considered in the admissions process.8
The Medical School's special admissions program focused solely on
racial classifications. 9 Furthermore, the two track admissions
program excluded regular applicants from competing for seats in
the entering class with applicants from the special admission pro-
gram. ° This policy of insulating applicants from competing with
one another did not further the Medical School's goal of true di-
versity."
Justice Powell endorsed the Harvard admissions program as a
more acceptable method of achieving diversity. 2 The Harvard
admissions program deemed race or ethnicity as a 'plus' factor in a
particular applicant's file, but did not insulate the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for available seats." This
kind of program treated each applicant as a unique individual in
the admissions process, but it was flexible enough to consider all
pertinent elements of diversity. 4 Accordingly, Justice Powell
84. Id. at 310.
85. Id. at 311.
86. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
87. Id. at 314.
88. Id. A "quota" is a program that requires that a fixed number of positions be re-
served and filled exclusively with members of a certain minority group. See, e.g., Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
89. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315. Diversity furthers a compelling state interest when it en-
compasses other qualifications and characteristics instead of utilizing race as the predomi-
nant factor. See id. at 317.
90. Id. at 319-20.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 316.
93. Id. at 317. In its admission process, the committee had not set target-quotas, but
chose applicants who are not only admissible academically but had other strong qualities.
Id. at 316. All applicants had equal opportunities for consideration for every seat in the
class. Id. at 320.
94. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. Such qualities could include unique work or service experi-
ence, geographic location, special talents, leadership potential, maturity, and a history of
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found the Medical School's program unconstitutional and in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the decision set the
framework for other public universities to devise race-conscious
programs by following the aforementioned principles.95
Justice Brennan96 would have upheld the Medical School's pro-
gram as constitutional by applying an intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard because no fundamental right or suspect classification was
involved.97 In contrast to Justice Powell's opinion, Justice Bren-
nan contended that the Medical School's purpose of remedying the
effects of past societal discrimination was sufficiently important to
justify the use of race in admissions.9" In his view, Title VI prohib-
ited only those uses of race by a state or its agencies that would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.99 Congress, Justice Brennan
stated, "intended Title VI to permit preferential treatment of ra-
cial minorities as long as such action was consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment."100 Justice Stevens concurred with Jus-
tice Powell in holding the Medical School's program unconstitu-
tional, but he would have decided the case on statutory grounds
under Title VI, thus avoiding the constitutional issue.' 0
After the Bakke decision, the Supreme Court had an opportu-
nity to discuss its diversity rationale in the context of faculty in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.0' In writing the plurality
overcoming disadvantages. In addition, the weight attributed to a particular quality could
vary each year, depending on the applicants for the incoming class. Id. at 318.
95. Id. at 320.
96. Id. at 324 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting). Justice Brennan's opin-
ion was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id.
97. See id. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting). Justice Brennan
contended that racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes "must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Id. at 359 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
98. Bakke, 488 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting). These
Justices further opined that "[g]overnment may take race into account ... at least when
appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative or administrative bodies with
competence to act in this area." Id.
99. Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
100. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting). These Justices agreed that
neither "the legislative history, administrative regulations interpreting the statute, con-
gressional and executive action, or prior decisions" barred this contention. Id.
101. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
102. 476 U.S. 267 (1985). The school board and the union agreed upon a collective bar-
gaining agreement (CBA) that would protect employees who were members of certain mi-
nority groups against layoffs. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270. In the event that any layoffs were
needed, they would be done on a seniority basis, "except that at no time [would] there be a
greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority
personnel employed. . ." Id. However, in 1974, when layoffs became necessary, the school
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opinion, Justice Powell examined the school board's racial classifi-
cations under the same analysis applied in Bakke.' In Wygant,
the Court invalidated an attempt by a school board to maintain a
racially integrated faculty because its layoff program was not nar-
rowly tailored to promote this interest."' Extending preferential
protection against layoffs to certain minority employees over non-
minority tenured teachers, the Court opined, was a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' Fur-
thermore, Justice Powell noted that "other, less intrusive means of
accomplishing similar purposes [of a racially integrated faculty]
are available, such as the adoption of hiring goals." 6 The school
board asserted that their purpose in designing the layoff program
was to remedy past discrimination against minorities, but the
Court found no evidentiary support for this assertion. 7 The
Court, consistent with its view in Bakke, expressed that "[s]ocietal
discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for impos-
ing a racially classified remedy."' 8 Justice O'Connor, in her con-
currence, noted that a public employer's practice, to further its
purpose of an integrated faculty, might be upheld if its implemen-
tation was narrowly tailored and did not "impose disproportionate
harm on the interests of individuals directly or adversely affected
by a plan's racial preference." 9
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, ' ° the Court invalidated a
plan created by the City of Richmond which required 30% of the
dollar amount of each city funded construction contract to be sub-
contracted to businesses that were owned by members of racial
minorities."' A majority of the Court, for the first time, adopted a
compelling state interest or strict scrutiny test as its standard of
board decided to retain the tenured nonminority teacher and laid off some minority teach-
ers, thus disrupting the percentages in the CBA. Id. at 271. The two minority teachers
along with the Jackson Education Association filed an action for the board's failure to ad-
here to the layoff provision in the CBA. Id.
103. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-79.
104. Id. at 283.
105. Id. at 282-84.
106. Id. at 283-84 (internal emphasis added).
107. Id. at 277.
108. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
109. Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
111. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78. The 'Plan' defined minority businesses to include "busi-
ness from anywhere in the country at least 51% of which is owned and controlled by black,
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo or Aleut citizens." Id.
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review in cases involving racial classifications. 112 The City argued
that its plan was remedial in nature enacted to promote participa-
tion of minority businesses in the local contracting industry."'
Justice O'Connor, relying heavily on Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke, rejected this argument because none of the evidence pre-
sented by Richmond pointed to any identified discrimination in
the city's construction industry."' According to the Croson court,
if a state or local entity attempted to defend its use of race for re-
medial purposes, it must demonstrate that the program is pursu-
ing a compelling interest and the goal is narrowly tailored so that
there is "no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate prejudice or stereotype."" 5
One year after Croson was decided, the Supreme Court refused
to apply the compelling interest test to racial classifications cre-
ated by federal law."6 In Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Commu-
nications Commission,"' the Court considered the constitutionality
of two race-based policies adopted by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC)."' Since Congress found substantial underrep-
resentation of minorities in broadcasting, the important objective
of the policies was to minority participation in the broadcast in-
dustry."' By a five to four vote, the Court gave deference to con-
gressional decision-making holding that "benign race-conscious
measures mandated by Congress . . . are constitutionally permis-
sible to the extent that they serve important governmental objec-
112. Id. at 493-95. Justice O'Connor announced the opinion of the Court, which was in
part a majority opinion and in part a plurality opinion. Id. at 476. The portion of the opin-
ion written by Justice O'Conner, which adopted the strict scrutiny test, was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens and Kennedy. Id. The majority justified
applying the strictest judicial inquiry because "there was no way of determining what clas-
sifications are 'benign' or remedial and what were motivated by racial." Id. at 493.
113. Id. at 478.
114. Id. at 506. Some of this evidence included a statistical study indicating that, al-
though the city's population was 50% black, only 0.67% of its prime construction contracts
had been awarded to minority business in recent years and statements of plan proponents
indicating that there had been widespread racial discrimination in the local, state, and
national construction industries. Id. at 469.
115. Id. at 493. The Court also noted the lack of consideration on the part of the city to
seek other race-neutral means to increase participation of minority business in the con-
tracting industry. Id. at 507.
116. See generally Metro, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
117. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
118. Metro, 497 U.S. at 552. The first policy enhanced the position of minority owner-
ship in the competition of licenses for new radio or television broadcast stations." Id. The
second policy, allowed 'distress sale' stations to be assigned only to FCC approved minority
enterprises meeting certain requirements before any competitive process took place. Id.
119. Id. at 554.
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tives with the power of Congress and are substantially related to
those objectives" 12°  In making this determination, the Court
stated that racial classifications created by the federal govern-
ment needed to satisfy only intermediate scrutiny to be constitu-
tionally permissible. 2'
After the Supreme Court's decision in Metro, the constitutional-
ity of affirmative action programs was at a split, applying strict
scrutiny to racial classifications employed by state entities and
applying intermediate scrutiny to federally funded programs.
However, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena,2 ' Justice O'Connor
overruled the intermediate scrutiny requirement and held that all
laws employing racial classifications must undergo strict scrutiny,
with no exception made on the basis of allegedly benign inten-
tions. 24 If strict scrutiny was not extended to race-based affirma-
tive action programs established by the federal government, it
would be inconsistent with prior precedent in Croson.'2' The Court
stated that "[t]he standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited
by a particular classification."2 ' The strict scrutiny standard ap-
plied to all race-based programs regardless of whether the pro-
grams were state or federal.' After the Court's holding in Ada-
rand, all race-based classifications imposed by federal, state, or
local governments would be constitutionally upheld only if they
were narrowly tailored in furtherance of a compelling governmen-
tal interest.
2 8
In Grutter, the Supreme Court had to address two constitutional
issues before permitting the use of racial classifications in admis-
sions decisions: (1) whether there existed a compelling interest,
and (2) whether the asserted goal was narrowly tailored to serve
its compelling interest.9 By analyzing both an institution's mis-
sion to achieve the educational benefits stemming from diversity
120. Id. at 564-65 (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995).
123. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
124. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224.
125. Id. at 222-24. However, the Croson Court did not state what standard of review the
[Due Process Clause of the] Fifth Amendment require[d] for such action taken by the
[f]ederal [g]overnment. Id.
126. Id. at 224 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
127. Id. at 227.
128. Id.
129. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325.
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and the constitutional privilege that all individuals are afforded
equal treatment under the law, the Supreme Court was correct in
upholding diversity as a compelling governmental interest.
Consistent with Bakke, the Grutter court granted deference to
the Law School's judgment that diversity is essential to its educa-
tional mission. This deference was analogous to Justice Powell's
diversity rationale founded upon the First Amendment principle
that "[t]he freedom of a university to make its own judgments as
to education include[d] the selection of its student body."' 3° Inher-
ent in this principle was the school's right to select those students
who would provide an exchange of ideas and views and enhance
the classroom environment. Because diversity plays a central role
in strengthening the experience of the entire student body and
preparing students for a culturally diverse society, the majority
properly upheld the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.
With respect to the second requirement, which explicitly re-
quired an institution's policy to be narrowly tailored, the major-
ity's analysis seems inconsistent with its past precedent. Bakke
established that university admissions policies are considered
narrowly tailored only if race or ethnicity was considered as a
"plus" factor without insulating a candidate from comparison with
other qualified applicants. '31 In other words, quotas were uncon-
stitutional, but using race as a "plus" factor was permissible. In
agreeing with Justice Kennedy, the majority erroneously granted
deference to the Law School's implementation of its goal. The ma-
jority stated that the Law School has determined, based on its ex-
perience and expertise, that a "critical mass" was necessary to fur-
ther diversity.'32 The Grutter court never required any evidence or
statistics to support this assumption. Instead, the majority's
premise for holding the Law School's program as narrowly tailored
hinged on their distinction between a quota and a critical mass.
When examining the Medical School's use of race in admissions,
which Justice Powell struck down as unconstitutional, and com-
paring it with the Law School's policy at issue in Grutter, it is dif-
ficult to conceptualize the difference between a quota and a critical
mass. Under the Medical School's program, a quota operated to
obtain a fixed number of underrepresented minorities, which were
130. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
131. Id. at 318.
132. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
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necessary to achieve student body diversity. The Law School, al-
though never defining what constituted a "critical mass," sought to
achieve "meaningful numbers" of minority individuals to obtain
this same compelling interest. Although the Law School did not
explicitly set any fixed number of seats or percentages to achieve
this "critical mass," their policy seemed to operate in the same
manner as a quota. When looking at the statistics, the percentage
of enrolled minority students varied only slightly between 13.5%
to 13.8% from 1995 to 1997.133 Although there was a greater vari-
ance of 5% between the years of 1987 through 1994, the percent-
age of enrolled minority students never fell below 12%."' This
evidence supports an inference that the Law School's pursuit of a
"critical mass" was converted into the equivalent of a quota. It
also seems inconceivable that the university can, on one hand, use
race as a "plus" factor and, on the other hand, still maintain these
consistent percentages. The Grutter court should have held that
the admissions program was functionally equivalent to a quota.
Under Bakke's analysis, the admissions program would not be
narrowly tailored and therefore unconstitutional.
Another persuasive argument, posed by Justice Scalia, specu-
lated that the focal point of future controversies may hinge on the
distinction between whether race becomes a determinative factor
or whether race is used flexibly to give an applicant enough indi-
vidualized consideration. The argument may perhaps be made
that when an institution is seeking to achieve diversity, and con-
siders all factors within an application, the defining feature be-
tween two applicants would ultimately come down to the individ-
ual who has the preferred race or ethnicity.
In conclusion, twenty five years after the decision in Bakke, the
Supreme Court has again reaffirmed the constitutionality of race-
based admissions policies in the realm of education, as long as
they are narrowly tailored. The decision in Grutter authorizes
institutions to mold their own admissions polices to consider race
as a potential "plus" factor in an attempt to establish a diverse
student body. However, institutions should still be cautious when
examining their own admissions policy so as not to blur the dis-
tinction between a critical mass and a quota. The next time the
issue is presented to the Supreme Court, a different conclusion




may be reached. As Justice O'Connor stated, "we expect that in 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be nec-
essary to further the interest approved today."
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